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Abstract 
In this paper we use a direct measure of individual risk-aversion to examine the relationship 
between risk-aversion and unemployment. Contrary to what the simple search model predicts, we 
observe that more risk-averse individuals are more likely to be unemployed. We present 
extensions of the search model that can reconcile the theory with the relationships observed in the 
data. 
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Introduction 
Although an individual’s attitude to risk is often crucial in predicting behaviour there appears 
to be little empirical research linking risk attitudes to individual characteristics1 and even less on 
the relationship between unemployment and risk-aversion. Feinberg (1977) examined the 
relationship between risk-aversion and unemployment and found that more risk-averse individuals 
had shorter unemployment spells. However, Feinberg used an indirect measure of risk-aversion, 
based on observed outcomes, such as having car insurance, the use of seat belts, and drinking and 
smoking habits. While these may be related to an individual’s attitude to risk, the estimated 
effects may also reflect other factors such as income or social class. In contrast to Feinberg we use 
a direct, non-parametric measure of risk-aversion to look at the relationship between risk and 
unemployment. We find no support for the basic job-search model; on the contrary we find that 
more risk-averse individuals are significantly more likely to be unemployed. In the final part of 
the paper we discuss extensions of the search model that can reconcile the theory with these 
observed findings.  
                                                 
1 Exceptions include Hartog et al (2002) or Guiso and Paiella (2001). 
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Theory 
The simplest partial equilibrium job search model assumes that infinitely lived agents are risk 
neutral and receive job offers at a rate  from a known exogenous wage offer distribution, F(w), at 
a cost c per draw. The agent can accept the offer currently in hand and work forever at that wage. 
Alternatively, they can refuse the wage offer, without the possibility of recall, and wait for the 
next job offer. It is well known that the solution to this model is characterised by a reservation 
wage strategy; workers accept a wage offer if it exceeds a predetermined threshold, wr which is 
called the reservation wage, and reject it otherwise. In this model the probability that a job seeker 
will find employment during a given period of search is simply (1-F(wr)).  
Pissarides (1974) extends this model to allow for the possibility of risk-averse decision 
makers who maximise expected utility rather than expected income. He argues that more risk-
averse individuals attach less value to the expected future gains of search and therefore will be 
more inclined to turn down the opportunity of continued search, in favour of employment. As a 
consequence more risk-averse individuals will spend less time unemployed but conditional on 
employment will receive a lower expected wage. In this model the probability of employment at 
time T is . Assuming that the offer arrival rate does not depend on 
the level of risk-aversion, this probability increases with the level of risk-aversion, , for all T. 
This follows from the fact that 
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Empirical Results 
The data we use in our study are taken from the 1995 and 2000 waves of the Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried out by the Bank of Italy.2 The measure of risk-
                                                 
2 For a more detailed description of these data see Guiso and Paiella (2001). 
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aversion is based on individual responses to the following question: “You are offered the 
opportunity of acquiring a security permitting you, with the same probability, either to gain 10 
million lire (about €2,582) or to lose all the capital invested. What is the most you are prepared 
to pay for this security?” If we let Pi denote the answer to this question (measured in units of a 
million lire) then we can use the results established in Hartog et al (2002) to approximate the 
Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion as: 
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For individuals who are risk neutral Pi=5, so that i(y)=0; for risk-averse individuals i(y)>0 
(with a maximum value of i(y)=.2 when Pi=0) and for risk-loving decision makers i(y)<0 (with 
a minimum value of i(y)=-.2 when Pi=10. Furthermore, the measure is symmetric around the 
point of risk neutrality. Summary statistics for our risk-aversion estimates are given in table 1. 
Our distribution of risk-aversion is in line with those reported by Guiso and Paiella (2001), using a 
subsample of our data, and Hartog et al. (2002) for The Netherlands.  
Table 2 estimates two simple models to examine the determinants of risk-aversion. The 
first estimates a linear regression of i on a set of regressors X. The second estimates a probit 
model where the dependent variable is 1 if the individual is risk-averse and zero otherwise. 
The results are much as expected. Consistent with decreasing risk-aversion, we observe a 
negative and significant effect of household income on risk aversion. On the other hand, 
women tend to be more risk-averse, whereas more educated individuals exhibit lower levels 
of risk-aversion.3 
Since our data provide no information on the duration of unemployment, we look at the 
relationship between risk attitudes and the probability of unemployment at the time of the survey. 
To do this we estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is 1 if the individual is 
                                                 
3 The theoretical relationship between risk aversion and education is ambiguous. Shaw (1996) provides a model that is consistent with our 
result.  
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currently unemployed and zero otherwise. The simple search model outlined above predicts that 
the coefficient of risk-aversion in this model should be negative.  
Measured risk-aversion based on hypothetical lotteries is sometimes criticised by 
researchers who doubt whether such questions can be answered in a meaningful way, and 
whether the resulting measures correlate with actual decisions made under uncertainty in a 
meaningful way. To address this issue we also examine the relationship between our measure 
of risk-aversion and two other outcome variables; investment in risky assets and the 
propensity to become self-employed4,5 In so far as our measure of risk is suitable we would 
expect to observe a negative relationship between risk-aversion and both the holding of risky 
assets and the probability of being self-employed.  
The main results of our paper are presented in Table 3. The results from both the asset 
equation and the self-employment equation are consistent with prior expectations. These results 
would seem to suggest that the lottery question we use provides a reasonable measure of risk 
aversion. With the basic job search model we would expect the risk-aversion measure to be 
negatively related to unemployment status. However, when we look at the unemployment probit 
we find the opposite result; more risk-averse individuals are more likely to be unemployed even 
when we include a set a large number of control variables. Furthermore the coefficient on risk-
aversion is precisely estimated with a p-value of 0.059. 
While our results reject the predictions of the basic search model, extensions of this model can 
yield the observed negative relationship between risk aversion and the probability of 
unemployment. The basic search model assumes that at each point in time the distribution of risk 
attitudes is randomly distributed among the stock of unemployed job-seekers and furthermore that 
the offer arrival rate is the same for all workers. There are a number of reasons as to why these 
assumptions may not hold. Firstly, since search itself is costly more risk-averse individuals may 
search less intensively. This in turn would reduce their offer arrival rate, which would in turn 
                                                 
4 For related analysis of these issues see also Guisso and Paiella (2001).  
5 When presenting the results we focus only the simplest specification. We have also estimated selection equation to try and take account of 
non-response to the lottery question and a Tobit model to account for truncation at zero in the asset equation. The estimated coefficient on 
the risk parameter in these models was similar to those reported in the paper. 
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reduce their probability of employment. Alternatively, it may be that by searching longer less risk-
averse individuals secure a more stable job match, which would reduce the likelihood of these 
individuals quitting or being fired. The simple job search model we presented does not allow for 
this. Once these features are included it is possible to derive a model in which risk aversion is 
positively related to the probability of unemployment.6 Unfortunately given the structure and size 
of our data set we are not able to address these issues empirically. Nevertheless we see them as 
important avenues for future research. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we use a direct non-parametric measure of risk-aversion to empirically test the 
relationship between attitudes to risk and unemployment. The basic search model predicts that the 
probability of unemployment should be lower for more risk-averse individuals. However, we find 
that more risk-averse individuals are significantly more likely to be unemployed. We suggest that 
studies of the search intensity of unemployed job-seekers and/or analysis of the relationship 
between job matching and risk-aversion may shed further light on our findings. 
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Table 1: Participation shares in the “lottery” question. 
 1995 2000 
Non participation 4,739 2760 
Do not know 1,586   720 
Unwilling to answer    648     20 
Missing      87  
with 0€ 2,418 2,020 
Participation (>€0) 3,396 1,173 
Total 8,135 3,933 
 (1) (2) (1) (2)
Risk-averse (P<€2,582) 86.26% 76.47% 97.21% 92.41%
Risk Neutral (P€2,582) 9.92% 16.99% 2.47% 6.73%
Risk Lovers (P>€2,582) 3.82% 6.54% 0.31% 0.85%
Note: (1) All respondents; (2) Responses with positive outcome 
 
Table 2: Determinants of Risk-aversion. The endogenous variable is  as defined in (1) 
 All responses  Responses with positive outcome 
 OLS  Probit  OLS  Probit 
 Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat 
Constant term 0.2656 16.59 3.7053 9.60 0.3131 11.19 3.3800 7.72
Number of children 0.0004 0.47 -0.0160 -0.82 -0.0005 -0.31 -0.0253 -1.13
Log(Income) -0.0088 -5.70 -0.2100 -5.61 -0.0126 -4.63 -0.1875 -4.43
Age 0.0003 5.03 0.0097 6.12 -0.0001 -0.88 0.0007 0.36
Years of schooling -0.0014 -5.27 -0.0245 -4.09 -0.0021 -4.47 -0.0235 -3.44
Female 0.0088 3.66 0.2175 3.63 0.0200 4.64 0.2997 4.41
Married 0.0026 0.98 0.0839 1.34 0.0049 1.02 0.1196 1.67
Sample size 8,180  4,265 
           Note: All models include dummies for region, city size and for year 1995. 
 
Table 3: Probit models on the probability of unemployment, self-employment and investment in risky assets. 
 All responses  Responses with positive outcome 
 Unemployment  Self-
employment
 Investment in 
risky assets 
Unemployment  Self-
employment
Investment in 
risky assets 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Constant term -4.014 -7.32 -1.733 -6.49 -2.181 -8.35 -3.676 -5.03 -1.365 -4.09 -1.940 -5.99
 (ARA) 0.734 1.89 -1.652 -7.96 -0.740 -3.63 0.595 1.36 -1.598 -7.08 -0.780 -3.56
Age 0.131 5.50 0.048 4.66 0.089 8.34 0.124 3.72 0.031 2.38 0.082 6.07
Age squared -0.002 -6.99 0.000 -4.91 -0.001 -10.42 -0.002 -4.87 0.000 -2.26 -0.001 -7.54
College -0.576 -3.73 0.697 12.09 0.059 0.96 -0.816 -3.12 0.675 9.21 0.004 0.05
Female -0.287 -3.27 -0.203 -3.60 -0.589 -10.56 -0.148 -1.20 -0.163 -2.17 -0.609 -8.12
Married -0.349 -4.16 0.134 2.41 -0.062 -1.19 -0.407 -3.40 0.123 1.66 -0.099 -1.42
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Sample size 8,037  8,203  8,203 4,185  4,278 4,278 
Note: All models include dummies for region, city size and for year 1995. The probit models for unemployment also 
include dummies for current and previous job for employed and unemployed individuals, respectively. 
